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Abstract
This paper reexamines the classical issue of the possible trade-offs between banking
competition and financial stability by highlighting different types of risk and the role of
leverage. By means of a simple model we show that competition can affect portfolio risk,
insolvency risk, liquidity risk, and systemic risk differently. The effect depends crucially
on banks’ liability structure, on whether banks are financed by insured retail deposits or by
uninsured wholesale debts, and on whether the indebtness is exogenous or endogenous. In
particular we suggest that, while in a classical originate-to-hold banking industry competi-
tion might increase financial stability, the opposite can be true for an originate-to-distribute
banking industry of a larger fraction of market short-term funding. This leads us to revisit
the existing empirical literature using a more precise classification of risk. Our theoretical
model therefore helps to clarify a number of apparently contradictory empirical results and
proposes new ways to analyze the impact of banking competition on financial stability.
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1 Introduction
This paper reexamines the classical issue of the possible trade-offs between banking com-
petition and financial stability by highlighting different types of risk and the role of leverage.
By means of a simple model we show how competition affects portfolio risk, insolvency risk,
liquidity risk and systemic risk differently. The relationships depend on banks’ liability struc-
ture, on whether banks are financed by insured retail deposits or by uninsured wholesale debts,
on whether bank leverage is exogenous or endogenous, and on the degree of competition in
the banking industry. In particular, we show that, while in a classical retail deposit funded
banking industry competition can increase financial stability, the opposite can be true for an
originate-to-distribute banking structure with a large fraction of market short term funding.
Understanding the link between bank competition and financial stability is essential to the
design of an efficient banking industry and its appropriate regulation. Because of the relevance
of this topic, a large body of literature has been devoted to this issue, with important contribu-
tions from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Yet, in spite of the critical importance
of the subject and notwithstanding today’s improved understanding of its complexity, there is
no clear-cut consensus on the impact of competition on banks’ risk taking and on the resulting
overall financial stability.
On this issue, two main theoretical modeling approaches contend: the charter value view
and the risk shifting view. The charter value theory, first put forward by Keeley (1990), assumes
that banks choose their level of risk and argues that less competition makes banks more cautious
in their investment decisions, since in case of bankruptcy they will lose the present value of
their future rents generated by their market power. Instead, proponents of the risk shifting
hypothesis, which originated with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), postulate that risks result from
the borrowing firms’ decisions and point out that higher interest rates will lead firms to take
more risk and therefore will increase the riskiness of the banks’ portfolio of loans.
The theoretical debate cannot be solved by resorting to empirical evidence, which is of-
tentimes equally ambiguous and contradictory.1 Part of the ambiguity stems from the diver-
sity of “financial stability” measurements. Indeed, bank risk has multiple dimensions, ranging
from portfolio risk, to insolvency, illiquidity, and systemic risk. Because competition may af-
fect different types of risk differently, there is no guarantee that papers that examine different
1See Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens (2011), who show that the relationship between competition and financial
stability is ambiguous and displays considerable cross-country variation.
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risk measurements can find the same relationship between competition and financial stability.2
Therefore, we believe that a first requirement to analyze the competition-stability link is to
build a model that encompasses different types of banking risks.
A second requirement is to consider the endogeneity of bank leverage, a point the literature
has largely ignored.3 We emphasize that when competition affects the riskiness of bank loans,
banks react to the change of risk by actively adjusting their leverage: For instance, safer loan
portfolios can lead banks to take on more debt. Consequently, the insolvency risk of banks is
not necessarily reduced. Furthermore, as banks adjust their leverage, all other bank risks, such
as funding liquidity risk and systemic risk, are also affected. We believe that bank leverage con-
stitutes a central hub that connects all types of banking risk and plays a key role in the analysis
of the impact of competition on financial stability. Therefore, we build a model wehere bank
leverage and risks are jointly determined by the optimization behavior of banks. Depending on
the characteristics of the banking industry, a diverse range of predictions can rise. We believe
this can help to reconcile with the empirical literature.
Our approach builds on a large body of literature on banking competition that starts with
the seminal paper of Keeley (1990). As mentioned before, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) rightly
point out that the intrinsic countervailing force of firms’ risk-shifting can make the relationship
between competition and financial stability ambiguous. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010)
further refine Boyd and De Nicolo’s argument by showing that the low profit resulting from
competition reduces banks’buffer against loan losses and can, therefore, jeopardize financial
stability. Wagner (2009) considers both banks’ and entrepreneurs’ incentives to take risk on the
portfolio side: Once entrepreneurs and banks move sequentially, the overall effect coincides
with the charter value hypothesis. The fact that all these contributions focus solely on insol-
vency risk and take the simplifying assumption of exogenous leverage has been one of the main
motivations for our paper. In this aspect, our paper is also related to Allen, Carletti, and Mar-
quez (2009). The authors study banks’ leverage in a competitive environmentshow and suggest
that as competition reduces charter values, banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers are reduced.
In equilibrium, banks have to hold more capital to maintain proper incentives to monitor.
Because our objective is to explore the impact of competition on the different types of risk,
our starting point has to be the microfoundations of borrowing firms’ risk taking. Following
2Table 3 offers a synthetic survey of the different choices in the measures of competition and risk in the
empirical contributions to the analysis of the competition-financial stability link.
3For example, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) considers banks solely financed by debt. Martinez-Miera and
Repullo (2010) assume the cost of equity to be independent of banks’ risk.
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Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we assume that firms’
investment decisions are subject to moral hazard, so that a higher interest rate leads them to
take riskier investment projects. Consequently, greater banking competition decreases portfolio
risk but also reduces the banks’ profit, which serves as a buffer against loan losses. On top
of portfolio and insolvency risk, funding liquidity risk is then introduced through a global
games approach. Using this framework, we study the impact of banks’ competition on financial
stability, both when bank leverage is exogenous and when it is endogenous.
Our main result is that the relationship between insolvency risk and banking competition
crucially depends on the degree of banks’ market power and their liability structure. The use
of a specific model allows us to solve the model analytically and show that the risk shifting
hypothesis is satisfied for a low level of insured deposits and high levels of market power while
the charter value is correct in the opposite case. So the impact of banking competition on fi-
nancial stability could be the opposite in a classical originate-to-hold banking industry and in
an originate-to-distribute one. This result can be helpful in understanding the apparent contra-
dictions in the empirical results; it is also relevant to test the impact of banking competition as
it predicts that the results should vary depending on the characteristics of the banking industry.
In addition, our analysis of the different types of risks allow us to establish the impact of
increased banking competition on each type of risk. First, when leverage is exogenous, which
can be interpreted as capital requirements being binding, competition will always increase liq-
uidity risk, because it reduces the banks’ profits which can provides a buffer against liquidation
losses. If instead, leverage is endogenous, it presents a countervailing force to portfolio risk,
moving always in the opposite direction, because when the portfolio of assets becomes safer
the bank will increase its leverage and its solvency and liquidity risks and conversely4. Never-
theless, the total credit risk of a bank, defined as the sum of solvency risk plus funding liquidity
risk is dominated by the impact of competition on insolvency risk. We also extend the model
to incorporate systemic risk and find the results to be robust: although the overall risk is higher,
the impact of competition on financial stability still depends upon de degree of banks’ market
power and their liability structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 establishes the
benchmark case, exploring how insolvency and liquidity risks are affected by banking com-
4This is clearly illustrated in the extreme case where a bank’s strategy is to maintain a given insolvency risk,
which is in line with the idea of “economic capital” . In this case, any changes in portfolio risk are exactly offset
by the bank’s leverage adjustment.
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petition under the assumption of exogenous leverage. In section 4, we determine endogenous
bank leverage and analyze its impacts on banks’ insolvency and illiquidity. The results contrast
with those under exogenous leverage. Section 6 extends the baseline model to study systemic
risk and financial contagion. We devote section 6 to the empirical literature, reinterpreting the
empirical findings with the refined definition of “financial stability” and forming new testable
hypotheses. Relevant policy implications are discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model Setup
2.1 Portfolio risk and competition
We consider a one-good, three-date (t = 0, 1, 2) economy where all agents are assumed to be
risk neutral. There are three types of active agents: entrepreneurs, banks, and banks’ wholesale
financiers; and one type of purely passive agents: retail depositors. There are a continuum
of entrepreneurs. They are penniless but have access to long-term, productive, but potentially
risky projects. Each project requires one unit of initial investment and takes two periods to
fruitify. It yields a gross return of x > 1 if succeeds, and 0 if fails. Projects are subject to
moral hazard: Each entrepreneur chooses privately a probability of success P ∈ [0, 1] in order
to maximize his expected utility.




Here r ∈ (1, x) is the gross loan rate charged by banks, and P2/2b denotes the disutility for
exerting efforts. b ∈ (0, B] represents an entrepreneur’s type, with a higher b implying a better
type and lower marginal cost of effort. An entrepreneur’s type is private information, in par-
ticular, unknown to banks. Banks hold a prior belief that b is uniformly distributed in interval
[0, B]. Entrepreneurs’ reservation utility is normalized to zero.
Because idiosyncratic risk diminishes in a bank’s diversified portfolio of loans, we dispense
with modeling this type of risk, and focus instead on a non-diversifiable bank-level risk that
affects the whole portfolio. We assumet that whether a project succeeds or not is jointly affected
by an entrepreneur’s choice P and a bank-level risk factor z. The risk factor z follows a standard
normal distribution. Its realization is identical for all loans in a bank’s portfolio, but can vary
across banks. Following Vasicek (2002) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we assume
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that the failure of a project is represented by a latent random variable y. When y < 0, a project
fails. The latent variable y takes the following form
y = −Φ−1(1 − P) + z, (2)
where Φ denotes the cumulative densitfy function of standard normal distribution. Thus a
project defaults either because of an entrepreneur’s moral hazard (a low P) or an unfortunate
risk realization (a low z) that affects the bank’s whole portfolio. For the sake of consistency,
note that the probability of success P is given by:
Prob(y ≥ 0) = 1 − Prob(y < 0) = 1 − Prob(z < Φ−1(1 − P)) = 1 − Φ(Φ−1(1 − P)) = P.
The modeling complexity is necessary to analyze banks’ leverage. For leverage to play any
role, there must be imperfect correlation for loan defaults.5 In the current setup, the bank-level
risk factor z generates correlated loan defaults, and the entrepreneur heterogeneity makes the
correlation imperfect.
Banks are assumed to invest in a continuum of projects. We further assume the loan market
is fully covered and all types of entrepreneurs are financed. The loan portfolio generates a
random cash flow that we denote by θ.
In order to focus on bank leverage and risk, we dispense with the specific modeling of loan
market competition and consider the loan rate r as a sufficient statistic for the degree of compe-
tition. With lower r associated greater competition, our setup captures the driving force for risk
reduction in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and is consistent with mainstream competition models
that predict competition leading to lower spreads.6 The assumption also fits empirical litera-
ture, which finds low interest margins associated with lower market concentration, Degryse,
Kim, and Ongena (2009).
5Under the simplifying assumptions of either zero or perfect correlation, a bank’s capital level cannot affect
its insolvency risk. In the first case, the law of large numbers leads to zero risk for a well diversified portfolio,
and banks do not need hold any capital. In the second case, once the correlated defaults happen, any capital level
lower than 100% is insufficient to prevent a bank failure.
6The opposite relationship may be obtained in models based on Broecker (1990) where an increase in the
number of banks raises the probability for a bad borrower to get funded in equilibrium, which implies an increase
in the equilibrium interest rate.
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2.2 Bank funding and liquidity risk
Each bank holds a unit portfolio of loans,7 and finances it with a mixture of debt and equity.
At t = 0, a bank raises VF from insured retail depositors, VD from short-term wholesale credi-
tors, and the rest, VE = 1 − VD − VF , from equity holders. Because insured retail depositors are
insensitive to banks’ risk and play a purely passive role, we assume that their supply of fund is
inelastic and fixed, VF = F. We also assume that the financial safety net of deposit insurance is
offered to banks at no cost.8
The wholesale debts are assumed to be raised in a competitive market where investors are
risk neutral and require a market interest rate that is normalized to zero. Each bank’s debt is
jointly financed by a continuum of creditors. The debts are demandable, risky, and promise a
face value D at t = 2. Their short-term nature allows wholesale creditors to withdraw early at
t = 1, before banks’ risky investment matures. Provided that a bank does not fail at t = 1, a
creditor receives qD by running on the bank. Here, 1−q ∈ (0, 1) represents an early withdrawal
penalty. Alternatively, the debt contract can be viewed as promising an interest rate qD/VD at
time t = 1 and D/VD at time t = 2. For simplicity, we assume that the bankruptcy cost is
sufficiently high such that once bankruptcy happens, the wholesale creditors get zero payoffs
and only a senior deposit insurance company gets the residual cash flow.
We follow the literature of global games and model bank runs as a non-cooperative game of
incomplete information. We assume that at t = 1 each wholesale creditor privately observes a
noisy signal si = θ + εi, where εi is pure noise that follows a zero-mean continuous distribution
on a small interval. Based on the signal, the wholesale creditors play a bank-run game. Each
of them has two actions: to wait until maturity or to withdraw early. A creditor who chooses
to withdraw early will receive nothing if the bank fails at t = 1, and qD if the bank does not
fail on the intermediate date. If the bank is only able to pay early withdrawals at t = 1 but goes
bankrupt at t = 2, creditors who choose to wait will receive nothing. If the bank does not fail
at t = 2, depositors who choose to wait receive the promised repayment D. Once a bank’s cash
flow is insufficient to repay its debt, it declares bankruptcy and incurs a bankruptcy cost.
7The assumption that banks hold only loans but no cash is obviously meant to simplify the model. But to
allow for endogenous cash holding would not change our results. In this specific setting, the optimal cash holding
always equals zero, because the low returns earned on cash reduces banks’ overall profitability and generates
thinner buffers against fire-sale losses. Despite of the fact that cash helps to avoid loan fire-sales in the first place,
funding liquidity is not reduced by greater cash holding.
8Assuming a flat deposit insurance premium that is based on the expected equilibrium debt ratio will not
qualitatively change our results.
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A bank’s loan portfolio takes two periods to mature. When facing early withdrawals, a bank
has to sell part (or all) of its assets in a secondary market at a fire-sale discount. The liquidity
mismatch leads to the risk of bank runs. To model the fire sale, we assume that by selling one
unit of asset that generates cash flow θ, the bank obtains only a fraction of it.
θ
1 + λ
Here λ > 0 reflects the illiquidity of banks’ long-term assets that can be attributed to moral haz-
ard, e.g., bankers’ inalienable human capital in monitoring entrepreneurs, or adverse selection,
e.g., buyers concerned with banks selling their ‘lemon’ loans.9 We focus on the natural case
where runs make it more difficult for a bank to repay its debts, which occurs when the discount




Inequality (3) captures the liquidity mismatch between banks’ asset and liabilities, stating that
it is costly to pay for short-term deposit withdrawals with the sale of long-term assets. If the
condition is not satisfied, we will have a paradoxical scenario where banks can more easily
meet their debt obligations in fire sales, and an insolvent bank with θ < D + F will be saved by
a bank run, provided (1 + λ)qD + F < θ.
2.3 Endogenous leverage
Banks set their leverage in order to maximize the equity value of existing shareholders.
Since retail deposit is fixed in supply (VF = F), each bank optimizes on the amount of whole-
sale debt claims D.
We assume that the cost of capital is higher than the cost of debt and denote by k the equity
premium. So the expected return on capital is 1 + k. The classical justification of the equity
premium would be the tax benefits of debt. Alternative justifications include the dilution costs
à la Myers and Majluf (1984) and the renegotiation costs à la Diamond and Rajan (2000).11
9The alternative assumption of banks using collateralized borrowing generates similar results. See Morris and
Shin (2009). In that case, 1/(1 + λ) reflects the hair-cut in the collateralized borrowing.
10Note also that condition (3) is always true as q approaches 1.
11When a corporate tax is levied at a constant rate τ and debt repayments are exempted, k reflects the cost of
losing tax shields. With 1 + k = 1/(1 − τ) or τ = k/(1 + k), the model will provide the familiar expression that
firms trade off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs.
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In the presence of bankruptcy costs, the optimal leverage will trade off between the cost of
equity and the expected cost of bankruptcy. The existence of liquidity risk makes the choice
of leverage slightly more complex, because when evaluating the chance of bankruptcy, banks
need to take into account both insolvency and illiquidity risk.
2.4 Time line
The timing of the model is summarized in the figure below.
t = 0
1. Banks choose capital
structure (D).
2. Entrepreneurs choose
P for a given r.
t = 1
1. Wholesale creditors decide to run
or not after observing private signals.
2. Banks that face runs sell their as-
sets at a discount.
3. Banks fail or survive.
t = 2
1. Returns realize for
surviving banks.
2. Wholesale creditors
who have not run get
paid provided that their
bank does not fail.
3 Banking risks with exogenous leverage
In this section, we show that competition can affect different types of bank risk differently.
We move upward the spectrum of types of risk: from loan and portfolio risk, to insolvency risk,
and to the risk of being solvent but illiquid. We extend the model in section 5.1 to incorporate
also systemic risk and contagion.
3.1 Loan portfolio risk
In the spirit of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), we show that bank competition reduces loan
default risk by curbing entrepreneurs’ moral hazard. Note that entrepreneurs’ utility maximiza-
tion yields the following probability of success.12
P∗b =
 1 if b ∈ [1/(x − r), B]b(x − r) if b ∈ (0, 1/(x − r))
12Entrepreneurs’ participation constraints are always satisfied, because their expected utility is non-negative
for optimal P∗b.
9
While an entrepreneur of type b ≥ 1/(x− r) will not default for any finite realization of z, loans
issued to entrepreneurs of lower types can default. This makes a natural partition between
risk-free and risky loans. Given the uniform distribution of b, a fraction α of loans




are risk free, and the complementary fraction (1 − α) of loans are risky and have positive
probabilities of default. The riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio is therefore reflected by 1 − α,
with a smaller α associated with higher risk.
As in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), the riskiness of loan portfolio decreases with banking
competition. When banks charge lower loan rates under fierce competition, entrepreneurs have





We further characterize banks’ loan and portfolio risk by deriving the distribution of loan
losses and that of cash flows. Denote the fraction of non-performing loans in the risky pool by
γ. We show that γ follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This suggests that the expected loan
loss in the risky pool is always 1/2. The riskiness of a loan portfolio solely depends on the
size of the risky pool. When the risky pool shrinks under competition, the bank’s portfolio risk
decreases.
Lemma 1. The loan loss γ, defined as the fraction of loan defaults in the risky pool, follows a
uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
A loan portfolio generates the following cash flow θ.
θ ≡ αr + (1 − α)
[
0 · γ + r · (1 − γ)
]
= r − (1 − α)rγ
The stochastics of the cash flow is driven by the random loan loss γ. Since γ enters the ex-
pression linearly, the cash flow θ also follows a uniform distribution, on support [αr, r]. Figure
1 depicts two cumulative distribution functions of cash flows, associated with different levels
of competition. When competition intensifies (loan rate drops from r′ to r), the distribution
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Figure 1: Cash flow distribution under two different levels of competition
1
α(r′)r′ α(r)r r r′
function becomes steeper, implying cash flow less volatile. Analytically, one can show that
σ(θ) = (1 − α)2r2σ(γ), monotonically increasing in r.
Lemma 2. A bank’s loan portfolio generates a random cash flow θ ∼ U(αr, r). When compe-
tition reduces loan rate r, the volatility of cash flow decreases.
3.2 Insolvency risk
Less risk-shifting and lower portfolio risk, however, do not necessarily imply a lower bank
insolvency risk, because competition also reduces bank profits which can be used as a buffer
against loan losses. In this subsection, we study how competition affects a bank’s insolvency
risk for a given level of debt.
A bank is solvent if its cash flow meets its liability, θ = r−(1−α)rγ ≥ F +D. The inequality
gives a critical level of loan loss, γ̂.
γ̂ ≡
r − (F + D)
(1 − α)r
A bank with a realized loan loss greater than γ̂ will become insolvent. For γ ∼ U(0, 1), this
implies that the solvency probability is equal to γ̂. A bank’s pure insolvency risk ρS R, i.e., the
risk of failure in the absence of bank runs, takes the following form.
ρS R ≡ 1 − γ̂ =




Note that insolvency risk is not monotonic in r. The reason is the same as in Martinez-Miera
and Repullo (2010). Banking competition has two countervailing effects on insolvency: On
one hand, lower loan rates reduce entrepreneurs risk-taking so that loan losses decrease (risk-
shifting reduction effect). On the other hand, competition also makes banks’ interest margin
thinner and banks less profitable, reducing the buffer available to absorb loan losses (buffer
reduction effect). The overall effect depends on parameters and is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For a given capital structure, a bank’s insolvency risk is reduced by competition
if and only if r2 > x(F + D).
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
The intuition behind condition r2 > x(F + D) is as follows. When project returns x are
sufficiently high, entrepreneurs will have enough stake in their projects, and the change of
loan rate will not substantially affect their incentive to take risk (analytically, note that ∂2(1 −
α)/∂x∂r < 0). In this case, the reduced loan rate under competition mainly translates into a
thinner capital buffer against loan losses. Therefore, for x > r2/(F + D), the buffer reduction
effect dominates and competition increases insolvency. Graphically, r2 > x(F +D) is equivalent
to two conditions: (1) ∂(αr)/∂r > 0 so that the distribution function satisfies a single crossing
condition, and (2) the face value of debt should be to the left of the crossing point. Figure 2
illustrates such a scenario: As banking competition weakens and the loan rate rises from r to
r′, solvency probability drops from ρS R to ρ′S R.
Figure 2: Change of insolvency risk under exogenous leverage
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3.3 Funding liquidity risk and bank run
In this section we use the global games approach of Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) to
examine banks’ funding liquidity risk. We derive a critical level of cash flow below which a
bank becomes solvent but illiquid: being able to repay its t = 2 liability in full if no one runs
on it at t = 1, but going to default if sufficient many wholesale creditors withdraw early. Such
a panic, or speculative bank run, can be found in papers like Morris and Shin (2000), Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005), and Rochet and Vives (2004). Yet in our paper global games are not as
much front and center, but rather used as a modeling device that allows us to define funding
liquidity risk and to study how competition affects it.
In principle, a bank can fail because of illiquidity either at t = 1 or t = 2. In the former
case, the liquidation value of all assets is insufficient to repay early withdrawals. In the latter
case, while partial liquidation generates sufficient cash to repay early withdrawals, the residual
portfolio is insufficient to repay creditors who wait until t = 2. Here we focus on the second
case, and assume that banks can always cover their liquidity needs at t = 1 even if all wholesale
creditors run on the bank.13 Analytically, this requires inequality θ/(1 + λ) > qD to be satisfied
for even the lowest possible θ. That is, αr > (1 +λ)qD.14 Denote by L the fraction of wholesale
financiers who run on the bank. A bank survives t = 1 withdraws but fails at t = 2 if the fraction
of early withdrawals exceeds the following threshold.
L >
θ − F − D
[(1 + λ)q − 1]D
(7)
A creditor’s decision to run or not depends on both her signal si = θ + εi and her belief
concerning other agents’ actions. Creditors play a switching strategy: They run on the bank if
the observed signal is smaller than a critical level. The equilibrium is characterized by a unique
critical level s∗.
Our assumption of the lack of common knowledge leads to so-called Laplacian property
of global games: No matter what signal that a player i observes, he has no information on the
rank of his signal as compared to the signals observed by the other players. Denote by M the
13We focus on this case because the alternative assumption that banks fail at t = 1 entails rather extreme
parameters, and does not hold once leverage is endogenous.
14One can also verify that this condition is satisfied at the optimal debt level in section 4.1.
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fraction of players that the player i believes to observe a higher signal than his. The Laplacian
property implies M ∼ [0, 1].15
Since the Laplacian property holds for all players and in particular for the creditor who
observes the critical signal s∗, the creditor will hold a belief that M ∼ U(0, 1) fraction of
players will not run on the bank and the rest (1 − M) will. Combined with condition (7), he
anticipates the bank to survive with a probability (θ − F − D)/[(1 + λ)q − 1]D.
The critical cash flow level θ∗ is characterized by the indifference between running on the
bank or not for the creditor who observes signal s∗.
Prob(t = 1 survival|s = s∗) · qD = Prob(t = 2 survival|s = s∗)D
Given Prob(t = 1 survival|s = s∗) = 1 and Prob(t = 2 survival|s = s∗) = (θ−F−D)/[(1+λ)q−
1]D, the indifference condition can be rewritten as q = θ−F−D[(1+λ)q−1]D , which implies the following
critical cash flow θ∗.
θ∗ = F + D + q[(1 + λ)q − 1]D
A run successfully happens when a bank’s cash flow θ falls below the critical level θ∗. Define
µ ≡ 1 + q[(1 + λ)q − 1]. A bank is solvent but illiquid if
F + D < θ ≤ F + µD,
where µ > 1 because (1 + λ)q > 1. Intuitively, in order to survive potential bank runs, a bank
has to make more profit than what is required to be barely solvent. Also the critical cash flow
increases in λ and D, because greater fire-sale losses and more exposure to unstable short-term
funding lead to a higher chance of illiquidity.
Proposition 2. There exists a critical level θ∗ = F + µD, µ = 1 − q[1 − (1 + λ)q] > 1, such that
a bank that has cash flow θ ∈ [F + D, θ∗] is solvent but illiquid.
Proposition 2 states that banks with θ ∈ [F + D, θ∗] face pure liquidity risk. These banks
are solvent in the absence of bank runs, but will fail if a run occurs. For θ ∼ U[αr, r], the
15More detailed discussion of the property can be found in Morris and Shin (2001) and we reproduce the proof
in Appendix B.
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When a bank’s wholesale debt D is exogenous, the pure liquidity risk will increase with
competition. The result follows directly from the comparative statics.
∂ρIL
∂r






Intuitively, competition contributes to illiquidity by reducing the expected cash flows. For a
given level of fire-sale losses (λ) and a given level of wholesale debt (D), the lower cash flow
due to intensified competition leads to a thinner buffer against fire-sale losses. Creditors who
withdraw early will then cause a greater loss to those who wait. As the negative externalities
aggravate, the coordination failure will happen more frequently among the wholesale creditors,
and therefore a bank run becomes more likely.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between bank failures due to insolvency and those
due to illiquidity. Given the observational equivalence, it is useful to examine a bank’s total
credit risk (ρTCR), i.e., the probability of bankruptcy for either solvency or liquidity reasons.
Since pure insolvency and pure illiquidity are disjoiont event, we have the total credit risk
ρTCR ≡ Pr(θ < θ∗) = Pr(θ ≤ D + F) + Pr(D + F < θ ≤ θ∗) = ρS R + ρIL.
ρTCR =
(F + µD) − αr
(1 − α)r
(9)
Examining the first order derivative with respect to r, one can verify that banking competition
reduces total credit risk (∂ρTCR/∂r > 0) if and only if
r2 > x(F + µD). (10)
Note that condition (10) is more stringent than the condition in Proposition 1. Once funding
liquidity risk is taken into account, for a parameter constellation satisfying x(F + µD) > r2 >
x(F + D), banking competition would decrease pure insolvency risk but increase total credit
16Contrary to the pure insolvency risk, the amount of stable funds provided by insured deposits, F, is absent
from the above measure of risk, as retail depositors do not have any incentive to run on the bank. The same would
hold true for long-term debts, as by definition their contract make it impossible for the claim holders to run the
bank.
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risk. In other words, when illiquidity risk is considered, the set of parameters where the result
of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) applies will shrink.
Proposition 3. For a given level of debt obligation, the probability for a bank to be solvent but
illiquid monotonically increases with competition. The total credit risk, defined as the risk of
bank failures due to either insolvency or illiquidity, decreases with competition if and only if
r2 > x(F + µD).
Proposition 1 and 3 suggest that even if banks do not adjust their leverage according to
changing competitive environment, competition can affect different types of bank risk differ-
ently. Focusing on solely one dimension of risk can lead to biased judgment for the overall
effects.
4 Endogenous leverage and its impacts
Although banks’ leverage decision are restricted by regulation, banks still have the ability
to choose the buffer above and beyond regulatory capital requirements as well as the maturity
structure of their debt. Leverage plays a crucial role in the determination of insolvency risk:
A low-risk portfolio financed with high leverage can end up generating a high insolvency risk.
Consequently, the bank’s optimal leverage choice may offset any reduction in the portfolio risk
due to competition. It is therefore crucial to study how the previous results change upon the
introduction of endogenous leverage.
4.1 Endogenous leverage
While a higher debt level saves on costly capital, it also entails a greater chance of bankruptcy
(caused by either insolvency or illiquidity). Banks rationally set their leverage to equalize the
marginal cost and the marginal benefit.
4.1.1 The general case
Banks choose their capital structure to maximize the leveraged firm value to existing share-









where bank cash flow θ has a density function h(θ, r) on support [θ, θ]. The bank will raise
VE from new shareholders, VD from wholesale short term creditors, and VF = F from insured
depositors. And the three sources of funding should provide the required amount of investment,


























VE + VD + VF = 1









[θ + k(F + D)]h(θ, r)dθ + (1 + k)
∫ F+µD
θ
Fh(θ, r)dθ − (1 + k)
}
(11)
The optimization program yields the following first order condition.
−µ
[
(F + µD∗) + k(F + D∗)
]
h(F + µD∗, r) +
∫ θ
F+µD∗
kh(θ, r)dθ + (1 + k)µFh(F + µD∗, r) = 0,
which can be written compactly as
−µ(µ + k)D∗h(F + µD∗, r) +
∫ θ
F+µD∗
kh(θ, r)dθ = 0,
or with H denoting the c.d.f. of θ,
D∗ =
k[1 − H(F + µD∗, r)]
µ(µ + k)h(F + µD∗, r)
. (12)
Note that equation (12) is an implicit (potentially non-linear) function of D∗. The analytical
solution is generally difficult to obtain.
17
4.1.2 Application to our setup
The uniform distributions in the current paper will greatly simplify the model. It is espe-
cially convenient to work with the loan loss γ ∼ U(0, 1). To facilitate exposition, we denote
γ̂µ ≡
r − (F + µD)
(1 − α)r
.
γ̂µ is a counterpart of γ̂: It defines a critical loan loss the bank will survive once liquidity risk is
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θ + k(D + F)
]
dγ + (1 + k)
∫ 1
γ̂µ
Fdγ − (1 + k)
}
(13)
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The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Proposition 4. A bank that maximizes its value by trading off the benefits of debt versus its
bankruptcy cost sets its debt to D∗ = (r − F)/[µ2/k + 2µ].








The risky debt that a bank issues is proportional to its maximum residual cash flow after
paying insured deposits F. In particular, D∗ increases in the cost of capital k, and decreases in
the accosiated liquidity risk µ.18
4.2 Risk under endogenous leverage
With exogenous leverage D replaced by endogenous D∗, the different bank risks under
endogenous leverage are defined analogously as in equations (6) and (8) - (9). Denote the risks
accordingly with a superscript star. One can write insolvency risk, liquidity risk, and total credit
risk as follows.
ρ∗S R ≡ 1 −







] r − F
(1 − α)r
(15)









ρ∗TCR ≡ 1 −








How competition affects bank risks under endogenous leverage follows directly from the com-
parative statics.
Proposition 5. If r2 > xF, pure insolvency and total credit risk decreases as competition
intensifies, whereas funding liquidity risk increases. Otherwise, the result reverses. Therefore,
under endogenous leverage, pure insolvency and liquidity risk always move in the opposite
direction, with the latter dominant in determining total credit risk.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
4.3 Exogenous vs. exogenous leverage
The endogenous leverage has a crucial impact on the various risks already identified. In
some instances, it reverses the results obtained under exogenous leverage. To emphasize this,
we summarize in Table 1 and 2 the results under exogenous and endogenous bank leverage for
a side-by-side comparison.
Table 1: Banking competition and risk under exogenous leverage
18Note that limµ↘1 1/[µ2/k + 2µ] = 1/(1/k + 2) < 1. Since 1/[µ2/k + 2µ] monotonically decreases in µ, it holds
that 1/[µ2/k + 2µ] < 1/(1/k + 2) < 1. A bank cannot issue more risky debt claims than its maximum cash flow
after paying the risk-free F and is unwilling to issue risky debt more than a fraction of (r − F).
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r2 < x(F + D) r2 ∈ [x(F +D), xθ∗) r2 ∈ [xθ∗, xθ∗∗) r2 > xθ∗∗
Pure insolvency risk + - - -
Pure liquidity risk + + + +
Total credit risk + + - -
A ‘+’ sign (‘-’ sign) denotes that competition increases (decreases) the bank risk considered.
Table 2: Banking competition and risk under endogenous leverage
r2 < xF r2 > xF
Pure insolvency risk + -
Pure liquidity risk - +
Total credit risk + -
A ‘+’ sign (‘-’ sign) denotes that competition increases (decreases) the bank risk considered.
4.4 Interpretation
Overall, our results state that the impact of competition on financial stability critically de-
pend on the type of banking industry that is considered. Two possible cases emerge. The case
r2 > xF, corresponds to less productive firms facing high borrowing costs, while banks obtain
high margins and raise funding in the market (low level of insured deposits). When this is the
case, total credit risk is reduced with competition. As a limit case, F = 0 can be interpreted as
investment banking. More competition means safer investment banking. Alternatively, the case
r2 < xF, corresponds to highly productive firms facing low borrowing costs, with banks mainly
financed through deposits. In such environment, the opposite result holds: banking competition
reduces financial stability. This correspond to classical retail banking with low margents and
prudent funding through insured deposits.
Although our model does not pretend to provide robust results that hold true in every en-
vironment, it is worth noticing the key ingredients that determine here the impact of bank
competition on the different types of financial stability. As shown by inequality (A.23), banks’
liability structure, and in particular the amount of short term wholesale funding, is central to
the relationship between competition and bank risk. Our model’s conclusions provide a much
richer view of the link between banking competition and financial risk than is usually consid-
ered.
1. To begin with, notice that the result depends upon the borrowing firms’ project returns
x. For a given level of deposits and banks’ market power, the effect of banking competition on
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financial stability depends upon how productive the firms are. In highly productive economies,
bank competition constitutes a threat to financial stability. The impact of moral hazard is re-
duced, and the key determinant of the link between bank competition and financial stability is
the role of the buffer generated by banks’ market power. Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 6 we observe that the threshold for x that inverts the relationship from banking competition
to financial stability is reached much earlier if we take into account the endogeneity of banks’
leverage. This is the case because banks will be more conservative in their choice of lever-
age, so that the strength of the Boyd and De Nicolo’s argument is weakened and the charter
value dominates. The argument can be reinterpreted considering the business cycle. In a boom,
banking competition jeopardizes financial stability, while, in a bust it reduces banks’ risks.
2. The level of market power is also essential in our framework. For high market power
competition reduces bank fragility, nevertheless a threshold may exist (provided that xF > 1)
beyond which the result is reserved. This is interesting from a policy perspective as it provides a
more nuanced prescription than the usual one: in order to sustain financial stability, it might be
interesting to promote competition up to a certain threshold, but beyond that point, competition
will lead to higher banking risk.
3. The role of stable funds is critical for our result. In a traditional banking industry funded
through deposits and long term bonds (equivalent in our context to insured deposits) where
xF > r2, competition will be detrimental to financial stability. Instead in a banking industry
where wholesale short term (possibly interbank) funding is prevalent, the Boyd De Nicolo
argument will prevail.
4. More generally, two types of banks, corresponding to the two possible signs of xF −
r2, may coexist and will react in a different way to an increase in competition. For banks
that rely less on stable funding xF < r2, in particular for investment banks, an increase in
competition will increase financial stability. Instead, for banks with high levels of deposits
and lower market power, for which the inequality xF > r2 is fulfilled, the opposite occurs
and banking competition’s main effect is to reduce the banks buffer and to encourage higher
leverage.
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5 Extension: contagion and systemic risk
A natural extension is to explore what happens once we add the risk of financial contagion.
We illustrate this in a two-bank setup, with two bank failures at the same time considered as
a systemic crisis.19 We make a stylized assumption that when both banks need to sell, the
fire-sale discount hikes from λ to λ′. This assumption captures the observation that secondary
market prices tend to fall further when more banks fail and are forced to sell their assets.20
Therefore, asset fire sales provide a channel of financial contagion: When the first bank goes
under, asset prices decline, which magnifies the coordination failure among the debt holders at
the other bank, leading to a second bank run.21
Following the structure of section 3 and 4, we first study how competition affects contagion
and systemic risk under the assumption of exogenous leverage, and then move on to the case
of endogenous leverage.
5.1 Contagion and systemic risk under exogenous leverage
Following the same procedure of section 3.4, one can derive a critical cash flow level
θ∗∗ = F + µ′D > θ∗
with µ′ = 1 − q[1 − (1 + λ′)q] > µ. A bank whose cash flow falls between [θ∗, θ∗∗] will not fail
if the other bank does not face a run, but will fail because of illiquidity if a run happen to the
other bank. Therefore, a bank of θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗∗] is exposed to contagion. We define the risk of
contagion as follows.




A systemic crisis happens when the two banks fail simultaneously, which incurs with the
following probability.






19The extension to n banks is straightforward.
20The decline of asset prices can be caused either by cash-in-the-market pricing or by informational contagion.
In the former case, market prices are driven down by the limited supply of cash. In the latter, a large number of
bank failures leads investors to form more pessimistic beliefs of banks’ common risk exposures and lowers their
willingness to pay for bank assets.
21For a full-fledged model where fire sales and bank runs mutually reinforce, see Li and Ma (2012).
22


















The liquidity risk, the exposure to contagion, and the risk of a systemic crisis are illustrated
in Figure 3. As the competitive environment changes, the critical cash flow θ∗ and θ∗∗ shift,
leading to the corresponding changes in various bank risks.
Competition affects systemic risk in two ways. First, it reduces banks’ buffer against fire-
sale losses, and therefore incerases banks’ exposure to contagion. On the other hand, it pro-
motes banks’ solvency if r2 > x(F + D), reducing the chance of the 1st first firesale. Overall,
competition reduces systemic risk if and only if r2 > x(F + µ′D), which forms a counterpart to
condition (10).
Proposition 6. For a given level of debt obligation, banks’ exposure to contagion increases
with competition. Competition reduces the risk of systemic crises if and only if r2 > x(F +µ′D).
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
5.2 Contagion and systemic risk under endogenous leverage
To simplify the analysis under endogenous leverage, we assume that regulators bail out both
banks in a systemic crisis so that banks do not to take into account systemic risk when setting
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their leverage.22 Consequently, the optimal wholesale debt remains the same as in equation
(14). Substituting that into (18) and (19), we obtain the probability of contagion and systemic








r − F − µ′D∗
(1 − α)r
)2
The impact of competition on banks’ exposure to contagion (ρ∗CTG) and the risk of a systemic
crisis (ρ∗S YS ) simply follow the comparative statics.
Proposition 7. For r2 > xF, while banks’ exposure to financial contagion increases with com-
petition, the risk of a systemic crisis decreases, provided µ′c < 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
To a large extent, the model presented a special case in the sense that its analytical solution
is not easily generalizable. Yet the result still conveys the key messages of the paper: (1)
banking competition affects different types of risk differently; and (2) endogenous leverage is a
central hub that both reflects changes in the cash flow riskiness and affects all different aspects
of banking risk.
We consider our model as a special case also because we take risk-shifting hypothesis as
a priori to start with. The argument of endogenous leverage is however more general and also
applies to models that take charter value hypothesis as a priori. In that case, when competition
induces banks to choose riskier portfolios with lower charter values, banks will optimally adjust
their leverage to balance the change in the portfolio risk. Again, leverage and risks will be
jointly determined by banks’ optimization behaviors. Yet as the priori flips, the overall results
might reverse as compared to those in the current paper.
22Relaxing this assumption would imply negative externalities of leverage: A bank that fails because of high
leverage is contagious to other banks. Since such cost is not taken into account in private decisions, banks are
likely to use greater leverage.
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6 Reinterpreting the empirical literature
The difficulties in analyzing the link between competition and stability exponentially in-
crease when we turn to empirical studies, which have led to a multiplicity of results that are
sometimes hard to reconcile.23
Our model aims to clarify and reconcile the literature by suggesting that bank risks should
be measured at four fundamentally different levels (asset risk, insolvency, illiquidity, and the
systemic risk) and competition can affect different risks differently.24 In our model, competition
affects banks’ asset risk directly by reducing borrowers’ risk-shifting. But as banks react to the
changes of asset risk by altering their leverage, all other types of risks are indirectly affected.
Therefore our reading of the empirical literature introduces drastic differences depending on
whether the evidence concerns the riskiness of banks’ assets, or the riskiness of banks them-
selves. We suggest a progressive approach to understand the impact of competition on banks’
risk-taking by refining the questions that are asked as successive layers.
1. Does competition increase the safety banks’ portfolios? In other words, is Boyd & De
Nicolo’s basic result true?
Next, once we take into account banks’ (endogenous) choice of leverage, the following
issues are to be addressed:
2. Does competition increase the risk of bank insolvency?
3. Does competition increase the funding liquidity risk of banks?
4. Does competition increase banks’ systemic risk?
Revisiting the empirical literature through this filter leads us to regroup the empirical results
in a more complete and orderly way, taking into account explicitly endogenous leverage, and
refusing to consider the different measures either equivalent or complementary in the assess-
ment of the impact of competition on financial stability.
23In the end of this section, we summarize in Table 3 the empirical papers that we surveyed, highlighting the
whole variety of risk measurements studied and the diverse results obtained.
24Just like the multiple risk measures studied in the current paper, various competition measures abound in
the empirical literature, ranging from franchise value (Tobin’s Q), to market concentration (e.g., HHI, C-n), to
structural measures (i.e., P-R H-stat., Lerner’s index, Boone’s indicator), and to institutions (e.g., contestability of
the market such as activity and entry restrictions). (See Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009) for a comprehensive
review on banking competition measures.) While some empirical studies, e.g., Claessens and Laeven (2004) and
Schaeck, Cihák, and Wolfe (2009), show that concentration is a poor proxy for bank competition, we are still left
with a wide range of possibilities, and the industrial organization literature does not provides us an unambiguous
answer which measure is most reliable.
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6.1 Portfolio risk: non-performing loans
The basic postulate of the Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) is that competition will reduce the
riskiness of banks’ portfolio, an issue independent of the banks’ leverage decision. On contrast,
charter value hypothesis suggests that banks’ overall investment strategy will be more risky
when the opportunity cost of bankruptcy is lower. Therefore, knowing whether Boyd & De
Nicolo’s basic conjecture is in line with empirical evidence is a crucial step forward. In order
to measure the riskiness of assets, measures like stock volatility, as in Demsetz, Saidenberg,
and Strahan (1996) and Brewer and Saidenberg (1996), are contaminated by leverage; whereas
non-performing loans (NPLs) can be a natural candidate. And a bulk of literature appears to
support this view by taking NPLs as one of the key dependent variables in their analysis.25
Restricting the measurement of asset risk to NPLs implies focusing on a very specific di-
mension of the broad link between competition and stability, where we might hope for some
consensus. Unfortunately the evidence is still mixed even with this drastic reduction. The ini-
tial paper on charter value, Keeley (1990), did not consider NPLs but rather overall risk of bank
failure. The use of NPLs can be found in more recent works such as Salas and Saurina (2003)
and Yeyati and Micco (2007). The authors found an increase in non-performing loans as bank
competition increased in Spain and in eight Latin American countries respectively. Jiménez,
Lopez, and Salas (2010) also find supporting evidence for charter value hypothesis, but only if
market power is measured by Lerner indices. Support for risk-shifting hypothesis can be found
in Boyd and Jalal (2009), who find competition negatively correlated with loan losses for banks
both in the US and in 134 non-industrialized countries. The finding is further corroborated by
Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009). Having studied a cross-section of banks in 23 devel-
oped countries, the authors conclude that banks with a higher degree of market power exhibit
significantly more loan portfolio risk.
Since market structure and bank loan loss can be jointly determined, researchers have also
examined natural experiments, such as nationwide banking in the US, in order to establish a
causal relationship between competition and stability. But again contradictory results arise.
While Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report that “Loan losses decrease by about 29 basis points
in the short run and about 48 basis points in the longer run after statewide branching is permit-
25Some caveats are in order regarding the accuracy of this measurement. First, banks can manipulate NPLs by
rolling over bad loans. Second, a risky loan granted today will only default in the future, e.g., after a two-year lag
if we follow Salas and Saurina (2003), and the rate of default will depend on the business cycle (Shaffer 98).
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ted”, Dick (2006) finds out that “charged-off losses over loans (...) appears to increase by 0.4
percentage point following deregulation”.26
6.2 Individual bank risk: insolvency
Because of the endogeneity of banks leverage, a lower portfolio risk does not necessarily
translate into a lower bank default risk. For example, Salas and Saurina (2003) show that a
bank’s capital ratio increases in its Tobin’s Q, thus providing evidence on the (endogenous)
reaction of leverage to charter value. This potential divergence is best illustrated in Berger,
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009): In spite of finding NPLs positively correlated with banks’
market power, the authors show that banks of greater market power have lower insolvency risk
because of their higher capital ratios.
Since Keeley (1990) the literature has been focusing on the risk of individual bank failure.
In his classic paper, Keeley (1990) considers the market-value capital-to-asset ratio and the in-
terest cost on large, uninsured CD’s. Following his approach, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Stra-
han (1996) use seven different measures of BHCs’ risks and in each of them franchise value is
statistically significant providing support to the charter value theory.27 Brewer and Saidenberg
(1996) found also corroborating evidence that the standard deviation of stock returns volatility
was negatively related to S&L franchise values as measured by the market-to-book asset ratio.
In our judgement, a bank’s z-score and distance to default can be natural measurements
for its insolvency risk, and many empirical works take those as the main risk measurement.28
Still, there are important nuances in the empirical findings. Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens (2011)
find on average a positive relationship between banks’ market power and their z-scores. Nev-
ertheless, they report large cross-country variation in this relationship, with it being negative in
many cases. Boyd and Jalal (2009) further challeged the charter value hyphothesis: using both
26The approach bears its value for banking deregulation is usually associated with a removal of barriers to
entry that will increase competition. Yet, it is not only associated to the removal of barriers to entry, as it might
also affect the range of financial products banks are allowed to invest in and the structure of financial institutions.
In other words, bank liberalization has not only an effect on banks’ competition, but also an indirect effect on
banks’ strategies other channels. This implies that the “banking deregulation” measure of market power explores
the effect of a package of measures related to market power on financial stability, but market power is only an
undistinguishable part of it.
27The risk measurements include annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns, systematic risk, firm-
specific risk, capital-to-assets Ratio, loans-to-assets ratio, commercial and industrial loans-to-assets ratio and loan
portfolio concentration.
28A bank’s z-score is calculated (RoA + E/A)/σ(RoA), and is meant to capture a bank’s distance from
bankruptcy. Distance-to-default is defined similarly using stock market information. Note that even though the-
oretical models made no prediction concerning how competition affects bank leverage, empirical studies have
indirectly taken into account leverage as leverage a component of the risk measures.
27
US and cross-country samples the authors consistently find competition negatively correlated
bank insolvency risk, measured by lower z-scores and actual bank failures. Confirming this
view, De Nicolo and Ariss (2010) show that large loan market rents predict higher probabilities
of bank failures and lower bank capitalization.
6.3 Individual bank risk: illiquidity
Funding liquidity risk has largely been overlooked by the empirical studies on bank com-
petition, mainly because given a bank failure, it is very difficult to distinguish illiquidity from
insolvency, Goodhart (1987). Still, recent literature suggests various indicators of bank fund-
ing liquidity risk, making it possible to examine the relationship between bank competition and
funding liquidity risk.
To begin with, Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2012) and Brunnermeier, Kr-
ishnamurthy, and Gorton (2013) suggest a liquidity mismatch index. The index is based on
accounting inforamtion,29 captures funding liquidity risk from both asset and liability sides,
and therefore constitutes a natural choice of liquidity risk measurement. Alternatively, based
on market information, Morris and Shin (2004) identify extra yield due to illiquidity risk in
their study of bond pricing; and Veronesi and Zingales (2010) construct a bank run index using
CDS spreads. Both can be used too as dependent variables in a regression on bank competition.
At the very least, microeconomic theories predict a range of determinents for funding liquidity
risk. The risk is shown to decrease in firesale loss-absorbing buffers (e.g., higher returns or
more capital), to increase in asset market liquidity (e.g., greater cash holding), and to decrease
in the amount of uninsured short-term funding. As those determinants can be measured by
accounting data, how they are related to banking competition invites future research.30
6.4 Systemic risk
The analysis of systemic risk is, obviously, even more difficult since it often has to deal with
cross-country analysis, and the precise definition of a banking crisis itself as well as its timing
are also subject to different interpretations. Thus, while some authors define a systemic crisis
by systemwide public interventions, or 10% of the banking industry being affected, others like
29Please see Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2013) for its implementation.
30Based on the theoretical predictions, Morris and Shin (2009) provide a practical guide to estimate liquidity
risk. And Bonfim and Kim (2011) present an attempt to measure funding liquidity risk by a variety of liquidity
ratios which are constructed with the aforementioned determinants.
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Table 3: Does banking competition lead to instability? Various risk and competition measure-
ments, and diverse results from the empirical literature.
Paper Risk Competition Results Data Source
Keeley (1990) Interest Cost Tobin’s q Yes US
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) Stock Volatility Market-Book Value Yes US
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) Stock Volatility Market-Book Value Yes US S&L banks
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) NPLs Deregulation No US
Salas and Saurina (2003) Loan Loss Tobin’s q Yes Spain
De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2005) Z-Score HHI No Non-industrialized
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) Crisis Dummy Concentration Yes Cross-Country
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) Crisis Dummy Contestability No Cross-Country
Dick (2006) Loan Loss Deregulation Yes US
Yeyati and Micco (2007) Z-Score & NPLs P-R H-Stat. Yes Latin America
Schaeck and Cihák (2010a) Capitalization P-R H-Stat. No Developed Countries
Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) Lending standard Number of banks Yes US
Boyd and Jalal (2009) Loan Loss HHI No US/Cross-Country
Boyd and Jalal (2009) Z-Score HHI No US/Cross-Country
Boyd, De Nicolo, and Loukoianova (2009) Crisis Dummy HHI/C3 No Cross-Country
Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) NPLs Lerner Index/HHI No Developed Countries
Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) Z-Score Lerner Index/HHI Yes Developed Countries
Schaeck, Cihák, and Wolfe (2009) Crisis Dummy P-R H-Stat. No Cross-Country
Schaeck, Cihák, and Wolfe (2009) Duration until crisis P-R H-Stat. No Cross-Country
Schaeck and Cihák (2010b) Z-Score Boone’s Indicator No US/EU
Jiménez, Lopez, and Salas (2010) NPLs Lerner Index Yes Spain
Jiménez, Lopez, and Salas (2010) NPLs HHI/C5 No Spain
Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens (2011) Z-Score Lerner Index Yes Cross-Country
De Nicolo and Ariss (2010) Z-Score Deposit market rent Yes Europe
De Nicolo and Ariss (2010) Z-Score Loan market rent No Europe
Dick and Lehnert (2010) Personal bankruptcy Deregulation Yes US
Dick and Lehnert (2010) NPLs/risk management Deregulation No US
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) D-to-D Correlation Lerner Index No Cross-Country
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) and De Nicolo, Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin
(2004) prefer to measure the probability of systemic risk by pairwise correlation of banks’
distance-to-default or constructing an indicator of the probability of failure for the five largest
banks.31
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) analyze a sample of 69 countries over a 20-year
period find that more concentrated national banking systems are subject to a lower probabil-
ity of systemic banking crisis. Still, they point out that concentration need not be related to
market power, as already mentioned by Claessens and Laeven (2004), and that other measures
of competition may lead to the opposite result. Contradicting that result,Schaeck, Cihák, and
Wolfe (2009) show, using the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic as a measure for competition in 45
countries during 1980-2005, that more competitive banking systems are less prone to systemic
crises and that time to crisis is longer in a competitive environment.
31It should be noted that with newly developed measurements on systemic risk such as marginal expected short-
falls or CoVaR in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), one can also link a bank’s market power to its contribution to
the systemic risk.
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Our paper’s empirical prediction states here that an increase of competition may have dif-
ferent effects depending upon the amount of insured retail deposits, and the profitability of
projects and banks’ spreads, thus suggesting new lines for future empirical research based on
the differentiation of different types of banking systems. It would be interesting to pursue this
research by distinguishing among different types of banks. If we interpret our model literally,
this would be to distinguish banks with low deposit to asset ratios from those with a high deposit
to asset ratio. Still, more generally, this could be interpreted as dividing the banks according to
their different access to short maturity market funds.
7 Discussion and policy implications
Because the aim of our paper is to clarify the multiple concepts of risk and the key role
leverage, our model has made a number of drastic simplifying assumptions that although lead
to relatively simple propositions but cannot be easily generalized. Indeed, our framework con-
siderably understates the complexity of the issue, because competition also affects banks’ port-
folio choice, e.g., the correlation of their portfolios, securitization, cash hoarding, and so on,
which are all abstracted from in the current setup.
Also our model’s main objective is not to address the design of overall banking regulation,
and consequently, from that perspective, it suffers from two limitations: On the one hand,
it does not take into account the impact of competition on increasing productivity through the
Shumpeterian creative destruction process, Dick (2006). On the other hand, it does not consider
the supply of credit, which is exogenously set as all firms are able to get financed. In spite of
this, it is interesting to consider the implications that our results have for regulatory policies.
Two main lessons can be drawn: the first regarding the impact of competition in general, and
the second regarding capital and liquidity regulation.
The first lesson is that a one-size-fits-all approach to the analysis of the link between bank-
ing competition and financial stability is insufficiently rigorous. To be more precise, we con-
clude that the link depends among other things on the degree of market power of financial
institutions. If financial institutions have a high market power, then competition reduces total
bankruptcy risk (the sum of insolvency and liquidity risk) in financial institutions, confirming
the risk shifting hypothesis of Boyd and De Nicoló. Still, in this high market power case, we
show that the impact is dampened by the increase in liquidity risk the increase in competition
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causes. On the other hand, once the banking industry is sufficiently competitive, the inequality
is reversed and additional competition leads to financial instability, thus confirming the char-
ter value assumption. From that perspective the policy position depends upon whether market
power is above or below some threshold that depends upon firms’ productivity as well as upon
banks’ liability structure.
Second, a simple extension of our framework, consisting in distinguishing wholesale short-
term market funding from long-term market funding (D = DS + DL), also has implications
regarding liquidity regulation. Indeed, we show that a more competitive banking industry has
a higher level of liquidity risk, proportional to DS , if leverage is exogenous. This is directly
related to capital regulation, because if capital regulation is binding, leverage becomes exoge-
nous. As a consequence, liquidity regulation, as suggested by Basel III, can reduce the liquidity
risk that is implied by fiercer competition.
8 Concluding remarks
We develop a model to study bank risk in competitive environments. We model explicitly
the credit risk created by borrowing firms’ moral hazard and examine how banks optimally
adjust their leverage in the light of various risk. With the theoretical framework, we clarify the
concept of financial stability: it has multiple dimensions ranging from portfolio risk to systemic
risk. We show that competition can affect different types of risk differently, and the idea of an
identical impact of banking competition on financial stability that would hold across types of
banks and types of firms has no theoretical foundation. This can help explain the diverse find-
ings in the empirical literature. We further suggest that banks’ leverage and liability structure
play a key role in determining the relationship between banking competition and financial sta-
bility. As a consequence, testing our model’s prediction that the competition-financial stability
link depends upon the type of bank and the state of the economy through firms self financing
and productivity may lead to an important step forward in our understanding of the issue.
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Appendix A Proof of propositions
Appendix A.1 Proof of lemma 1
To derive the uniform distribution of loan loss γ, take a risky type b̃ < 1/(x − r); and define
the fraction of entrepreneurs below b̃ in the risky pool by γ̃. We have
γ̃ =
b̃ − 0
1/(x − r) − 0
= b̃(x − r). (A.20)
Consider the critical realization z̃ = Φ−1(1− P∗
b̃
) such that an entrepreneur of b̃ does not default
but all types b < b̃ do. So for z = ẑ, one will have γ = γ̃. To derive the distribution of γ, notice
that
F(γ̃) ≡ Prob(γ < γ̃) = Prob(z > z̃) = 1 − Prob(z < z̃)
= 1 − Φ(Φ−1(1 − P∗b̃)) = P
∗
b̃
= b̃(x − r).
By equation (A.20), we have b̃ = γ̃/(x − r). Substitution yields
F(γ̃) = γ̃,
implying γ ∼ U(0, 1).
Appendix A.2 Proof of proposition 1
On the comparative statics of insolvency risk, computation is simplified if we consider its
complementary probability, 1−ρS R = [r−(F +D)]/(1−α)r. Examining its first order derivative
with respect to r, we obtain:
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Recall that ∂α/∂r = −1/B(x − r)2 and (1 − α) = 1/B(x − r). Taking out the common factor, we
will have































r2 − x(F + D)
]
.
Pure insolvency risk is reduced by competition if and only if
r2 > x(F + D). (A.21)
Appendix A.3 Proof of proposition 4
A systemic crisis takes place if both banks’ cash flow fall below θ∗∗, i.e., ρS YS = Prob(θ <
θ∗∗)2. This allows us to obtain:
∂ρS YS
∂r

































r2 − x(F + µ′D)
]
.
As ∂α/∂r < 0, the sign of the comparative statics is determined by r2 − x(F + µ′D): the risk of
a systemic crisis decreases with competition if and only if r2 > x(F + µ′D).
Appendix A.4 Proof of proposition 6
Denote c ≡ 1/(µ2/k+2µ). The pure insolvency risk, illiquidity risk, and total credit risk can
be written as the following, with again total credit risk being the summation of pure insolvency
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risk and illiquidity risk. The comparative statics with respect to r follow from the definitions.
ρ∗S R ≡ 1 −
r − F − D∗
(1 − α)r
= 1 −
(1 − c)(r − F)
(1 − α)r




c(µ − 1)(r − F)
(1 − α)r
ρ∗TCR ≡ 1 −
r − F − µD∗
(1 − α)r
= 1 −
(1 − µc)(r − F)
(1 − α)r
(1) Comparative statics: Insolvency risk
∂ρ∗S R
∂r
= −(1 − c)
∂
∂r
( r − F
(1 − α)r
)
We have shown c < 1. So the expression shares the same sign as
∂
∂r




(2) Comparative statics: Liquidity risk
∂ρ∗IL
∂r
= (µ − 1)c
∂
∂r




With µ > 1, the sign will be opposite to that of expression (A.22).
(3) Comparative statics: Total credit risk
∂ρ∗TCR
∂r
= −(1 − µc)
∂
∂r
( r − F
(1 − α)r
)
Note that µc = 1/(µ/k + 2) < 1. The comparative statics of total credit risk is again determined
by the sign of expression (A.22).
Therefore when competitive environment changes, pure insolvency risk moves in the oppo-
site direction as pure liquidity risk. With the latter dominating, total credit risk changes in the
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same direction as that of pure insolvency. Now we characterize the condition that
∂
∂r











































With ∂α/∂r < 0, competition increases insolvency risk, decreases liquidity risk, and increases
total credit risk if and only if
r2 > xF. (A.23)
Appendix A.5 Proof of proposition 7
The proof resembles that of proposition 6. Comparative statics again hinge on the sign of
∂
∂r




Note that for the exposure to contagion
∂ρ∗CTG
∂r






= (µ′ − µ)c
∂
∂r




and for the risk of a systemic crisis
∂ρ∗S YS
∂r









r − F − µ′D∗
(1 − α)r
)
= −2Prob(θ < θ∗∗)(1 − µ′c)
∂
∂r




Therefore, when r2 > xF, loan competition leads to greater exposure to contagion yet a smaller
chance of systemic crisis.
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Appendix B The Laplacian property
In the model, the noisy signal received by representative creditor i has a structure
si = θ + εi.
We assume εi follows a continuous distribution with c.d.f. G.
Denote the critical signal for creditor i to switch from “wait” to “run” by s∗. And upon
observing s∗, the creditor i believes a M fraction of creditors observing signals higher than
hers. We prove M ∼ U(0, 1).
Proof. For the continuous distribution G, the fraction of creditors who observes signal higher
than s∗ equals the probability that a creditor j’s signal s j > s∗. Then, we have
M = Prob(s j > s∗|si = s∗) = Prob(θ + ε j > s∗|si = s∗)
= Prob(ε j > s∗ − θ|si = s∗)
= 1 −G(s∗ − θ)
The randomness of M is rooted in the fact that by observing si = s∗, creditor i is uncertain
about the realization of θ. As the perceived value of θ is random, so is the perceived M. Now
we derive the distribution function of M. For M̂ ∈ [0, 1], we have
Prob(M < M̂|si = s∗) = Prob(1 −G(s∗ − θ) < M̂|si = s∗)
= Prob(θ < s∗ −G−1(1 − M̂)|si = s∗)
= Prob(s∗ − ε j < s∗ −G−1(1 − M̂)|si = s∗)
= Prob(ε j > G−1(1 − M̂)|si = s∗)
= 1 −G(G−1(1 − M̂))
= M̂
Note that M = 1−G(s∗ − θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore for M̂ < 0 , Prob(M < M̂) = 0; and for M̂ > 1,
Prob(M < M̂) = 1. We prove M follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. 
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